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Blackmail
Ronald H. Coase*
An economist venturing to speak on a legal question must tread delicately. He finds himself dealing
with institutions the detailed workings of which are
largely unknown to him. He encounters a literature in which the doctrines, concepts and vocabulary are completely unfamiliar. An economist
wishing to understand how the legal system operates inevitably faces formidable obstacles, at any
rate if he is without legal training, as most economists are. And yet, having said this, any economist
interested in understanding the real economic
world, rather than those imaginary worlds the analysis of which fills the pages of the economic journals, cannot ignore the influence of the legal
system on the working of the economic system.
Here I am not mainly thinking of the law relating
to regulation, antitrust, and taxation where, even if
the exact effect of the law may not be easy to discover, that it has an important influence is not
likely to be overlooked. What I have in mind is that
more general relationship between the legal and
economic systems which I discussed in "The Problem of Social Cost".' Economists commonly
assume that what is traded on the market is a physical entity, an ounce of gold, a ton of coal. But, as
lawyers know, what are traded on the market are
bundles of rights, rights to perform certain actions.
Trade, the dominant activity in the economic system, its amount and character, consequently
depend on what rights and duties individuals and
organizations are deemed to possess-and these
are established by the legal system. An economist,
as I see it, cannot avoid taking the legal system into
account. It is a burden we have to bear. Economists
cannot be expected to pronounce on the detailed
arrangements of the legal system, but we may be
*Ronald H. Coase is Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Chicago Law School. This
article was delivered as the 1987 McCorkle Lecture at the
University of Virginia School of Law on November 10, 1987.
It was subsequently published in 74 Virginia Law Review 655
(1988) and is reprinted by permission. Some of the footnotes
have been omitted; the omissions are not indicated. @ 1988 by
The University of Virginia.
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able to contribute something to our understanding
of how the legal system affects the economic system
and thus to the development of those general principles which should govern the delimitation of
rights.
In "The Problem of Social Cost" I thought I was
able to contribute something to the analysis of the
law of nuisance. Today I turn to the problem of
blackmail. I am emboldened to do this because of
the lack of any consensus among lawyers about the
nature of blackmail or about how it should be handled. Professor A.H. Campbell, writing in 1939 in
the Law Quarterly Review on "The Anomalies of
Blackmail," starts his article by saying: "The law
of blackmail has something in common with the
blackmailer: it allows its student no peace of
mind. "2 And ProfessorJames Lindgren, writing in
1984 in the Columbia Law Review, starts his article,
"Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail," by saying:
"Most crimes do not need theories to explain why
the behavior is criminal. The wrongdoing is selfevident. But blackmail is unique among major
crimes: no one has yet figured out why it ought to
be illegal." 3
Whether an economist can contribute to what is
clearly a difficult legal question is problematical,
but I will try. And I am the more willing to do so
because the question of blackmail came up at a
very early stage when I was developing the ideas
which were later to appear in "The Problem of
Social Cost." I was then at the Center for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at
Stanford, and that year another fellow at the Center was David Cavers of the Harvard Law School.
When I discussed my ideas with him he pointed
out, correctly, that if someone had a right to commit a nuisance, he might threaten to create that
nuisance simply to extract money from those who
would be harmed by it, in return of course for
agreeing not to do so. In effect, Cavers felt that
what I was advocating would lead to blackmail or
something analogous to it. Some economists made
the same point after I used this approach in my
article on The Federal Communications Commis-

2. A.H. Campbell, The Anomalies of Blackmail, 55 L.Q.
Rev. 382, 382 (1939).
3. James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail,
84 Columbia L. Rev. 670, 670 (1984).
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sion.4 This led me to include some passages in
"The Problem of Social Cost" which were
intended to deal with this objection. I explained,
using the example of the cattle raiser and the crop
farmer, that if the cattle raiser were liable for the
damage brought about by his cattle, the crop
farmer might plant crops which otherwise would
not be profitable because the resulting crop damage would be such that the cattle raiser, to avoid
having to pay for the damage, would be willing to
pay the crop farmer not to plant these crops. However, if the situation were reversed and the cattle
raiser were not liable for the damage brought about
by his cattle, he might increase the size of his herd
above what it would otherwise be, thereby increasing crop damage, in order to induce the crop
farmer to pay him for agreeing to reduce the size of
the herd. My purpose in pointing this out was to
show that actions which were undertaken solely for
the purpose of being paid not to engage in them,
actions which could be called blackmail, would
arise whatever the rule of liability or, if you like, the
system of rights. I did this not to initiate a discussion of blackmail but rather to avoid having to do
so. In any case, had I wanted to discuss the subject of blackmail, a regime of zero transaction
costs would have provided a poor setting in which
to do so.
Of course, it would not be necessary actually to
plant the crops or increase the herd before agreeing
not to do so. All that need be done would be to
threaten to take such actions-and for most people
payment for not carrying out a threat is the essence
of blackmail. Of course, it is reasonable to suppose
that someone wishing to obtain money for agreeing
not to engage in an activity would normally not
engage in it before negotiating but would threaten
to do so since this would be less costly. And when
money or some other advantage is to be extracted
for not revealing unsavory information about
someone (the case most people have in mind when
they speak of blackmail) the only way to proceed is
to threaten, since, once the information has been
disclosed, no blackmail is possible. Although I did
not examine blackmail in "The Problem of Social
Cost," my attitude to the problem raised by Cavers
and others was clearly complacent. I pointed
4. The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law &
Econ. 1 (1959).
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out that such activities or threats were a preliminary to an agreement and did not affect the longrun equilibrium. I accepted the fact that bluff and
threats were a normal part of business bargaining
and I spoke of the terms of the agreement depending on the shrewdness of the parties. Later, Harold
Demsetz pointed out that if there are many cattle
raisers and crop farmers and there is competition
among them, since refraining from this blackmailing behavior costs nothing, the amount that would
have to be paid to obtain an agreement not to
engage in it would tend towards zero.' Blackmail
incidental to a business relationship did not appear
normally to be a serious problem. In any case,
since bargaining is an inevitable feature of an
exchange economy, there is not a great deal that
can be done about it. This complacent attitude
tends to be reinforced for an economist by the belief
that there are no losers in an exchange-it is beneficial to both parties. But is this also true of a transaction in which the object is to suppress
information, as is the case in many blackmailing
transactions?
No doubt there are economists who think that it
is. An illustration of this point of view can be found
in a work of fiction written by two economists, both
of whom were professors at the University of Virginia and one of whom still is. I am referring to the
book, The Fatal Equilibrium, written by Professors
Breit and Elzinga, using the pseudonym Marshall
Jevons. 6 In that book, a young economist is being
considered for promotion to a tenured position at
Harvard. He discovers that one of the members of
the promotion and tenure committee is a fraud.
Speaking to his fiancee, the young economist, Dennis Gossen, says: "The culprit has as much as confessed it to me, although not in so many words, and
has promised to support my promotion if I'll keep
quiet." His fiancee replies: "Dennis, that sounds
like blackmail." Dennis, however, does not agree.
He responds, "I wouldn't call it blackmail. It's like
gains from trade in a way. Support my promotion
and keep your reputation. I keep quiet and you
help me get tenure."' His fiancee is not reassured
and most people would share her feeling. Unlike
5. Harold Demsetz, When does the rule of liability matter?
1 J. Legal Stud. 13, 23-24 (1972).
6. MarshallJevons, The Fatal Equilibrium (1985).
7. Id. at 102.
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the agreements made as a result of business negotiations, the attempt to obtain money or some other
advantage for not disclosing unsavory information
about someone is disliked by most people. Why is
this so?
Ordinary people have a fairly clear idea of what
blackmail involves and do not like it. As an example which fits very well the ordinary person's view
of blackmail I have chosen a case of which there is a
full account in the Old Bailey Trial Series. Mr.
Bechhofer Roberts, the editor, in his foreword, has
this to say:
Blackmail is by many people considered the
foulest of crimes-far crueller than most murders, because of its cold-blooded premeditation
and repeated torture of the victim; incomparably more offensive to the public conscience
than the vast majority of other offences which
the law seeks to punish-but there is on record
one case of blackmail, perhaps the only one,
which is redeemed to some extent from baseness
by the circumstances in which it arose, by the
personalities of its participants, and by certain
elements of high comedy which accompanied its
development.'
This was "The Mr. A Case." I remember reading
about it as a schoolboy, since it attracted a great
deal of attention in the British newspapers.
In 1919, in the morning of Christmas night, in
the St. James and Albany Hotel in Paris, a bedroom door was opened and an Englishman entered
who discovered Mrs. Robinson in bed with Mr. A,
whose real name I need hardly say was not Robinson. It was, after all, the season of goodwill. There
is a conflict in the testimony about what happened
next. According to the Englishman, Mrs. Robinson
jumped out of bed and attacked him, saying "My
brute of a husband." According to Mrs. Robinson,
the words she uttered were addressed to Mr. A and
were "I must get back tonight before that brute
reaches my husband." Mr. A was not present at the
trial to straighten out the contradiction. That Mrs.
Robinson should so testify was understandable
given that the Englishman who entered the bedroom was not Mr. Robinson but a Mr. Newton
whose occupations are given by Mr. Bechhofer
Roberts as "confidence-trickster, blackmailer,
8. The Mr. A Case 9 (C.E. Bechhofer Roberts ed., The Old
Bailey Trial Series, No. 7, 1950).
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cardsharper, forger, " an impressive list on any
resume. Whatever was really said in that bedroom
in Paris, Mr. A seems to have believed that Newton
was Mrs. Robinson's husband.
At this point I should disclose that Mr. A was
Prince Sir Hari Singh, the heir presumptive to his
uncle, the Maharajah of Kashmir, the pseudonym
Mr. A being used at the trial at the request of the
India Office. After the intrusion of this unexpected
visitor, Prince Hari Singh apparently sought the
advice of his aide-de-camp, Captain Arthur, who,
according to Mr. Bechhofer Roberts, had been recommended for this position by the India Office and
whose views were therefore to be taken seriously.
Captain Arthur seems to have warned the Prince
that Robinson would sue for divorce in England
naming him as co-respondent and that heavy damages could be exacted. This of itself would not have
disturbed the Prince. The vast majority of the
inhabitants of Kashmir were polygamists who presumably would not have found his conduct shocking. And the Prince's wealth was such that he could
pay any sum an English court was likely to award
without noticing it. But Captain Arthur apparently
also told the Prince that the scandal which would
accompany such divorce proceedings would lead
the India Office to veto his accession to his uncle's
throne. The Prince then drew up two cheques for
E150,000 or E300,000 in total (equivalent in real
terms to five or six million dollars today). Captain
Arthur left for London with the cheques, his mission being to pay Mr. Robinson not to sue for
divorce. On arrival in London, however, Captain
Arthur went to see Hobbs, a man specialising in
the shady side of the law. Hobbs opened a banking
account in the name of Robinson, paid in one
cheque, furnished the bank with a specimen signature and proceeded to draw out the whole of the
£150,000 with cheques signed "C. Robinson."
The second cheque was not cashed since the
Prince's solicitors in London, on learning of the
matter, insisted on payment being stopped. You
will by now have guessed that what I have been
describing was an ingenious blackmailing scheme
devised by Captain Arthur. The Prince was not the
first, and will not be the last, to regret that he
trusted a government department's recommendation. Hobbs paid about £40,000 each to Newton
and to Captain Arthur. But what of Mr. and Mrs.
Robinson? Hobbs told Robinson that Mr. A was
6

willing to pay £20,000 to stop divorce proceedings.
Robinson balked at first but finally agreed to
accept £25,000, out of which Hobbs, who knew
how a lawyer ought to behave, took £4,000 as his
professional fee. He gave Robinson banknotes
totalling £21,000 (worth perhaps $400,000 today).
Robinson testified that he handed the banknotes to
his wife. According to his counsel, Robinson did
this "to protect [his wife] from any temptation to
lead an immoral life in future," although one
would have thought the effect would have been the
exact opposite. Newton proceeded to India with the
second cheque (the Prince's solicitors having been
told falsely that it had been destroyed) with a view
to obtaining more money, but the Prince's Indian
wife died and the Prince was obliged, for religious
reasons, to go into seclusion. Newton returned
empty-handed. The Prince took no further action.
That the scheme came to light was the result of a
disagreement between Captain Arthur and Hobbs,
from whom Arthur tried, without success, to get
more money. Captain Arthur then imprudently
told Robinson that it was not £25,000 but E150,000
that Mr. A had paid for the concealment of what
the judge called "the defilement" of Robinson's
wife, but the judge, Lord Darling, was noted for his
witticisms. Robinson, on learning how he had been
deceived, was, of course, appalled by this dishonesty. He consulted his solicitors and it was finally
decided to claim £150,000 from the bank in which
Hobbs had deposited the cheque, for negligently
paying to Hobbs what should have been paid to
him. Although the jury decided that Mr. and Mrs.
Robinson were not parties to the blackmailing
scheme, this action failed, mainly because the
judge held that Robinson was laying claim to the
proceeds of a theft. However, the exposure of the
blackmail at the trial resulted in Hobbs being tried
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Captain
Arthur, who was in France and could not be extradited to England, was tried in France (where the
offense occurred) and found guilty. Newton, who
had been paid £3,000 (equivalent to fifty or sixty
thousand dollars today) by the bank to appear as a
witness in the first trial, turned King's evidence in
the trial of Hobbs and thus avoided prosecution
and made a profit out of the affair. He was a very
talented confidence-trickster. Mr. Robinson, who
was described by counsel as an "intermittent husband," no doubt resumed his previous relationship
7

with his wife. Notwithstanding the jury's finding, it
seems probable that the Robinsons were involved
in the blackmailing scheme along with Hobbs,
Newton, and Arthur but even if they were, it is
clear that they were completely outclassed. Mr. A,
who by this time had come out of seclusion, succeeded in due course to his uncle's throne without
any objection from the India Office. I have not told
all the twists and turns of this strange tale but this
case embodies the main elements of what the ordinary person thinks of as blackmail. A person is
trapped acting in a way which he believes would
harm his reputation if disclosed. He pays a sum of
money to prevent disclosure. The victim takes no
action to bring the blackmailer to justice because to
do so would lead to that disclosure which he was
anxious to avoid.
I have said that blackmail is not likely to arise out
of business relationships. It is most likely to be
found where there is a desire to conceal disreputable personal behaviour (or what is regarded as
such). It is therefore somewhat unexpected that
what are considered to be the leading cases on the
law of blackmail in England are concerned with
business relationships. I will start with the case of
The King v. Percy Ingram DenyerI This case is commonly referred to as Rex v. Denyer and I will just

refer to it as Denyer The Motor Trade Association,
composed of manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers,
and users of what were termed "motor goods," was
empowered by its by-laws to put on its "stop list"
the name of anyone selling an automobile or associated products above or below the manufacturer's
list price. For someone to be on the stop list meant
that no member of the Association would trade
with him. Mr. Read, who operated a garage in
Devon, was visited at the end of 1925 by a representative of the Association, who posed as someone
who had come from abroad and was going to buy a
house and wanted a car. Mr. Read was induced by
this man to sell a tire and to offer to sell an automobile below list price. In January 1926, Mr. Read
received a letter, signed by Mr. Denyer, the stop list
superintendent, saying that unless he paid E257 to
the Association, he would be put on the stop list, a
step which Mr. Read testified would put him out of
business. Mr. Read took the letter to the police and
Mr. Denyer was indicted for blackmail. The
9. The King v. Denyer [1926] 2 K.B. 258.
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offense was described in the Larceny Act, 1916, as
follows: "Every person who... utters, knowing the

contents thereof, any letter or writing demanding
of any person with menaces, and without any reasonable or probable cause, any property or valuable thing... shall be guilty of felony and on
conviction thereof liable to penal servitude for
life.. "10 Mr. Denyer was tried at Exeter, found
guilty and he was sentenced to six days in prison,
which must have been a relief given that he could
have received penal servitude for life. Note that the
offense was not that the Association induced Mr.
Read to sell below the list price nor that they threatened to put Mr. Read on the stop list. The Association was registered as a trade union and it was legal
for them to do these things. The offense was that
Mr. Denyer demanded a sum of money for refraining from putting Mr. Read on the stop list. The
case was taken to the Court of Criminal Appeal
and the verdict of the lower court was upheld. The
Lord ChiefJustice had this to say:
It has been said again and again, that because
this Trade Protection Association had the legal
right to put the name of Mr. Read upon the stop
list, it therefore had a legal right to demand
money from him as the price of abstaining from
putting his name upon the stop list. In the opinion of the Court, that proposition is not merely
untrue; it is precisely the reverse of the truth. It
is an excuse which might be offered by blackmailers to an indefinite extent. There is not the
remotest nexus or relationship between the right
to put the name of Mr. Read upon the stop list,
and a right to demand from him 2571 as the
price of abstaining from that course."I
It will have been noticed that this case is similar
to the "Mr. A Case" in that both Mr. A and Mr.
Read were set up to commit an act on the basis of
which the demand for money was made. But it
would not have been possible to use the Lord Chief
Justice's criteria in the "Mr. A Case." Mr. Robinson had a perfect right to bring divorce proceedings
against his wife on the grounds of her adultery with
Mr. A, and it was certainly legal for Mr. A to settle
the case by a payment to Mr. Robinson. And yet
there is no question in anyone's mind that the "Mr.
A Case" involved blackmail. The English courts
soon had an occasion to re-examine the question.
10. Id. at 261 n. 1.
11. Id. at 268.
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An automobile dealer, Hardie and Lane, had
been led to sell an automobile below list price in the
same way as had Mr. Read. Hardie and Lane were
then offered the same proposition-stop list or fine
-and they elected to pay the fine. An agreement
was made under which the fine was to be paid in
two installments. However, before the second
installment was paid, Denyer was decided. Thereupon, Hardie and Lane refused to pay the second
installment and sued for the return of the money
that they had already paid. They won their case in
the lower court based on the argument in Denyer,
but in 1928 this decision was appealed. In the
Court of Appeals, Hardie and Lane lost. The argument of Denyer was rejected.12
I will quote to you some passages from the opinion of Lord Justice Scrutton which will indicate
why he disagreed with Denyer.
I am quite unable to understand how it can be
illegal to say, "I could lawfully put you on the
stop list but if you do something which is not illegal, and is less burdensome to you than the stop
list, I will not exercise my power."... A member
of a club after dinner in a row damages some
club property. He is told that he is liable to
expulsion, but that the committee will not
enforce it if he makes good the damage. Are the
committee conspirators who have obtained
money or money's worth, by threats, which can
be recovered by the member?... [T]here is
nothing illegal in agreeing to do a legal act, to
avoid action which the other party may legally
take.... A. has land facing a new house of B.'s.
A. proposes to build on that land a house which
will spoil the view from or light to B.'s house,
and depreciate the value of his property. B.
implores A. not to build. A. says: "I will not
build if you pay me 1,0001., but I shall build if
you do not." B. pays the money and A. does not
build. Could it be seriously argued that B. could
recover the money back as obtained by threats?
A valued cook comes to her mistress and says:
"Raise my wages by 201. a year or I shall give
you notice." The mistress foreseeing, and much
disturbed in mind by, the tragedy that the loss of
the cook will involve pays the money. Can she
recover it as obtained by threats?""
12. Hardie and Lane Ltd. v. Chilton [1928] 2 K.B. 306.
13. Id. at 315-17.
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Later, Lord Justice Scrutton dealt directly with
the Lord ChiefJustice's rejection of the proposition
that because the Association had the right to put
Mr. Read on the stop list it also had the right to
demand money for not doing so. He said this:
The Lord ChiefJustice says it is an excuse which
might be offered by blackmailers to an indefinite
extent. I cannot understand this. The blackmailer is demanding money in return for a
promise to abstain from making public an accusation of crime. The very agreement is illegal....
A man has no right to suppress his knowledge of
a felony. How can this be analogous to proposing not to do a thing that you have a legal right
to do, if money is paid you, there being no public mischief in the agreement?"
It will have been noticed that while making some
telling points Lord Justice Scrutton's response does
not meet the problem of the "Mr. A Case," since
he appears to assume that blackmail involves suppression of knowledge of a felony. Adultery, at least
in England, is not a crime.
As a student taking the Bachelor of Commerce
degree at the London School of Economics I took a
law course in either 1929 or 1930 in which these
cases, which had only recently been decided, were
discussed. The purpose was to acquaint us with the
law relating to trade associations although our
teachers did not fail to draw our attention to the
interesting situation arising out of this conflict
between the criminal and the civil sides of the court
system, particularly as the Lord Chief Justice
issued a statement after the case of Hardieand Lane
Ltd. v. Chilton had been decided in which he said
that unless and until the decision in Denyer was
reversed by the House of Lords, it will be binding
for the purpose of the administration of the criminal law. Although these two cases were presented to
us in connection with the law of trade associations,
what appealed to the economist in me was the
question: when is it right and when wrong to pay
someone not to do something? I retained the memory of these cases over the years and I often wondered how the conflict between these two decisions
was ultimately resolved. But it was not until I went
to the University of Chicago Law School in 1964,
some 35 years after I had been taught about these
cases that I learned what had happened. This is
what I found.
14. Id. at 322.
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In 1937, a friendly action, Thorne v. Motor Trade
Ass'n, presumably arranged by the Motor Trade
Association, was taken to the House of Lords."
The question to be decided was whether the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal or that of the
Court of Appeals was correct. I need not leave you
in suspense. The opinion in Denyer was disapproved. The law lords particularly objected to the
statement of the trial judge that "a person has no
right to demand money, according to the Act of
Parliament, as a price of abstaining from inflicting
unpleasant consequences upon a man." As Lord
Wright said:
There are many possible circumstances under
which a man may say to another that he will
abstain from conduct unpleasant to the other
only if he is paid a sum of money. Thus he may
offer not to build on his plot of land if he is compensated for abstaining.... Or a man may offer
to abstain from prosecuting for a common
assault or infringement of his trade mark if he is
paid compensation.... 1 6
However, having disapproved of the basic proposition underlying the opinion in Denyer, they also
expressed their disapproval of Lord Justice Scrutton's opinion that if one has a legal right to do
something one, also has a legal right to demand
money for abstaining from doing it. Lord Atkin
said this:
Scrutton L.J. appeared to indicate that if a man
merely threatened to do that which he had a
right to do the threat could not be a menace
within the Act.... [T]his seems to me to be
plainly wrong: and I entirely agree with the criticism of this proposition made by the Lord Chief
Justice in Rex v. Denyer. The ordinary blackmailer normally threatens to do what he has a
perfect right to do-namely, communicate some
compromising conduct to a person whose
knowledge is likely to affect the person threatened. Often indeed he has not only the right but
also the duty to make the disclosure, as of a felony, to the competent authorities. What he has
to justify is not the threat, but the demand of
money.... [T]he only question is whether the
demand would be without reasonable or probable cause. It is here that I am unable to agree
15. Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass'n, 1937 App. Cas. 797.
16. Id. at 820.

12

with the decision in Denyer's case. It appears to
me that if a man may lawfully, in the
furtherance of business interests, do acts which
will seriously injure another in his business he
may also lawfully, if he is still acting in
furtherance of his business interests, offer that
other to accept a sum of money as an alternative
to doing the injurious acts. He must no doubt be
acting not for the mere purpose of putting
money in his pocket, but for some legitimate
purpose other than the mere acquisition of
money.I
Lord Wright continued:
[T]here are many cases where a man who has a
"right," in the sense of a liberty or capacity of
doing an act which is not unlawful, but which is
calculated seriously to injure another, will be liable to a charge of blackmail if he demands
money from that other as the price of abstaining. Such instances indeed are very typical cases
of blackmail.... Thus a man may be possessed
of knowledge of discreditable incidents in the
victim's life and may seek to extort money by
threatening, if he is not paid, to disclose the
knowledge to a wife or husband or employer,
though the disclosure may not be libellous....
Again a legal liberty (that is something that a
man may do with legal justification) may form
the basis of blackmail. Thus a husband who has
proof of his wife's adultery, may threaten the
paramour that he will petition in the Divorce
Court unless he is bought off. Though it is possible that the facts of such a case might show
merely the legitimate compromise of a claim to
damages, on the other hand, the facts might be
such as to constitute extortion and blackmail of a
serious type.'8
And other law lords expressed themselves to the
same effect.
All this brings us to what Professor Lindgren has
termed the "paradox of blackmail"-that although
it may be lawful to do something, it may be unlawful to demand money for refraining from doing it.
But when is it unlawful? The law lords leave this
obscure. "The facts may show," said Lord Wright.
But what facts, and how do they show it? The
Motor Trade Association really presented them
17. Id. at 806-7 (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 822.
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with a relatively easy case. Once it was agreed that
Parliament had granted it the power, because it was
a trade union, to put someone's name on a stop list,
a procedure which could ruin a business (for I
gather that the stop list at that time in England
would be effective), it becomes hard to object to an
action which merely reduced somewhat the profits
of that business. As Lord Russell said:
Having it in their power to place the plaintiffs on
the Stop List, but being desirous of taking a
more lenient course, they gave the plaintiffs the
option of paying a fine. I am wholly unable to
understand how it can be suggested that this was
not an eminently reasonable thing to do."
The problem is, as Dennis Gossen of The Fatal
Equilibriumwould have explained, there are always
gains from trade and blackmail involves a trade. It
is in the interest of the blackmailer to make payment of the money more attractive than the alternative. In this limited sense he also will want to be
lenient. Dennis Gossen, I imagine, would. have
regarded the demand, "your money or your life,"
as the offer of a bargain. Of course, murder is a
crime and there is no problem in characterising this
particular offer as blackmail. But suppose the offer
had been: "Your money or I will tell your wife." To
be murdered might well seem a preferred alternative. And yet telling his wife would certainly not be
a crime. However, demanding money for abstaining from telling her would very likely be blackmail
and therefore a crime. Why? The law lords threw
little light on this question. Lord Atkin admitted
that the rules of the Association were capable of
being abused. Lord Wright said that the money
demanded must be "reasonable and not extortionate." And Lord Roche said:
A demand of a sum extortionate in amount
would, I think, clearly be evidence...in a civil
case of an intent to injure as opposed to an
intent to protect trade interests and in a criminal
case of the fact that the sum was demanded
without reasonable or probable cause....

It

would, in my opinion, be both erroneous and
mischievous to give colour to the opinion that
because a demand of money [by the Association] is not necessarily unlawful or a crime it

19. Id. at 812.
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cannot under any circumstances be either the
one or the other.2 0
This is not really helpful. As you know, extortion is
often used as a synonym for blackmail and to say
that there is no extortion unless the demand is
extortionate does not aid us in identifying blackmail. One has the impression that the law lords
failed to get a handle on the problem.
It is not therefore surprising to learn that when,
in 1966, the Criminal Law Revision Committee
came to examine the law relating to blackmail in
the United Kingdom, it found the position very
unsatisfactory." The Committee in their report
point out that though there is no offence called
"blackmail," the name is commonly applied to
"the group of offences of demanding property with
menaces and similar conduct." The law is, however, as they say, "obscure" and "very complicated." Nonetheless, in practice things have not
worked out too badly, "but this is due rather to
restraint and common sense of prosecutors in limiting prosecutions to what is clearly recognizable as
blackmail in the ordinary sense than to any merits
in the [law itself]." It seems that blackmail, like
pornography, is difficult to define but you know it
when you see it.
Faced with the problem of defining blackmail,
the Committee felt that it had to go back to "first
principles." They say:
In general terms it seems reasonably clear that
the offense should include at least making an
improper demand of a financial character
accompanied by threats. Further on any view it
should apply to a threat to injure a person or to
damage his property unless he pays something
to which the person who makes the demand does
not pretend to be entitled.... Equally there is no
doubt that it should be blackmail for a person to
demand something merely as the price of not
revealing some discreditable conduct of which
he happens to know."
Having said this, the Committee noted that there
were serious difficulties in applying these general
propositions. When is a demand improper and
when is it permissible to make a threat to reinforce
20. Id. at 824-25.
21. Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eighth Report,
Theft and Related Offences, 1966, Cmnd. No. 2977, at
54-61.
22. Id. at 56-57.
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a demand? The Committee finally decided that the
test of illegality in making a demand should be
"whether the person in question honestly believes
that he has the right to make the demand." 2 Similarly, when dealing with the threat, they argue
"that the only satisfactory course would be to adopt
a subjective test and to make criminal liability
depend on whether the person who utters the threat
believes in the propriety of doing so." 24
As a result of the deliberations of this Committee, a section of the Theft Act, passed in 1968 in
England defined blackmail:
A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to
gain for himself or another or with intent to cause
loss to another, he makes any unwarranted
demand with menaces; and for this purpose a
demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the
person making it does so in the belief(a) that he has reasonable grounds for making
the demand; and
(b) that the use of the menaces is a proper
means of reinforcing the demand.25
This, although more definite than the old law,
clearly requires a good deal of interpretation.
Nonetheless, there is no reason to suppose that this
will lead to serious difficulties in the administration
of the law. The old law was even more obscure and
yet, as we have seen, there seems to have been few
problems in its administration. There is in effect an
unstated law of blackmail which cannot be discovered from the statutes but which is based on the
common sense of prosecutors, juries, and judges
and which it might be possible to infer from a
detailed study of the cases. Some economists, and
perhaps some lawyers, would expect that such an
investigation would show that the decisions in the
cases were those that led to the value of production
(in its widest sense) being maximised. Whether this
would be the result of such an investigation I do not
know. But what I will now do is to consider what I
think the decisions would be if in fact they had this
character.
Let us therefore return to the analysis of "The
Problem of Social Cost" and examine an example,
not the cattle raisers and crop farmers of that arti23. Id. at 57.
24. Id. at 59.
25. Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60 §21; see E. Griew, The Theft
Acts 1968 & 1978, §§12-01 to -34 (1986).
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cle, but one used by the judges in the Motor Trade
Association cases. A threatens to build a house
which will spoil the view from, and block the light
to, B's house. My understanding of the legal situation in England is that A would normally be entitled to build, even though it had these
consequences. Suppose that, as in Lord Justice
Scrutton's example, A demands £1,000 as the price
of agreeing not to build and that B pays this. Is this
blackmail? Suppose that A would not have built,
whether B made this payment or not, because the
cost of building a house on this site exceeded the
price at which it could be sold. In these circumstances, the demand for £1,000 could be regarded
as blackmail or something akin to it. It is a payment to A for agreeing not to do something which
he has no interest in doing. The E1,000 does not
represent what A would have lost by not buildingthe threat to build is made simply to extract money
from B. Of course, if A would have gained £600 by
building the house, only £400 of the £1,000 would
represent a blackmailing demand. But if blackmail
is paid, it is because the value to B of preserving his
amenities is greater than the additional value that
would be created by the construction of the house.
The payment of blackmail leaves the allocation of
resources unaffected and the value of production is
maximised. The only effect is to transfer money
from B to A. Since we cannot assume that B is more
worthy than A, what is wrong with it?
When I referred to the problem of blackmail in
"The Problem of Social Cost," it was simply to show
that, however rights were defined, there would
always be opportunities for this type of blackmail. I
pointed this out in the section of the article in which
it was assumed that transactions were costless and in
which therefore no resources were absorbed in bargaining. In such a world, it is not clear what the
objection would be to this type of blackmail. The
position is, however, very different if we make the
realistic assumption that transaction costs are positive. It is obviously undesirable that resources
should be devoted to bargaining which produces a
situation no better than it was previously.
Economists discuss exchange but until recently
have been very little interested in the process of
exchange and have certainly not devoted much
attention to the problem of blackmail. Normally,
when they notice something which appears to be
wrong in the working of the economic system, they
17

follow the prescriptions of Pigou and advocate government action, usually some form of taxation, but
sometimes regulation. Pigou does not discuss
blackmail as such, but his attitude to it can be
inferred from his discussion, in The Economics of
Welfare, of the situation in which "the relations
between individual buyers and sellers are not rigidly fixed by a surrounding market," a condition
which is, of course, extremely common."6 Pigou
then says that "it is plain that activities and
resources devoted to manipulating the ratio of
exchange may yield a positive private net product;
but they cannot...yield a positive social net product....". These activities are described by Pigou as
"bargaining" and "deception." This is what he
says of bargaining:
Of bargaining proper there is little that need be
said. It is obvious that intelligence and resources
devoted to this purpose... yield no net product to
the community as a whole... These activities
are wasted. They contribute to private, but not
to social net product.... [W]here their clients,
be they customers or workpeople, can be
squeezed, employers tend to expend their
energy in accomplishing this, rather than in
improving the organisation of their factories.
When they act thus, the social net product...of
resources devoted to bargaining may be, not
merely zero, but negative. Whenever that happens, no tax that yields a revenue, though it may
effect an improvement, can provide a complete
remedy. For that absolute prohibition is
required. But absolute prohibition of bargaining
is hardly feasible except where prices and conditions of sale are imposed upon private industry
by some organ of State authority."
Pigou evidently feels that there is nothing more to
be said on this subject. He therefore turns to
"deception" and reaches a similar conclusion:
"The social net product of any dose of resources
invested in a deceptive activity is negative. Consequently, as with bargaining, no tax that yields a
revenue, though it may effect an improvement, can
provide a complete remedy and absolute prohibition of the activity is required. "28
26. A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 200 (4th ed.
1932).
27. Id. at 201 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 203.
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"The Problem of Social Cost" was intended to
influence the thinking, not of lawyers, but of economists and its main purpose was to demonstrate
the inadequacies of the Pigovian approach and to
put forward what the author hoped was something
better. The Pigovian approach, as I have just said,
sets up an ideal world and then by government
action, usually some form of taxation or less commonly government regulation, endeavors to reproduce that ideal state in the real world. We can see
what it leads to in the case we are discussing. Bargaining, which involves bluff, threats and, to some
degree, deception should apparently be eliminated
by a prohibitive tax imposed, I suppose, "per unit
of bargaining" or "per unit of deceit," an operation which can be carried out on a blackboard but
nowhere else. But since elimination is what is
wanted, the right tax would be one which yielded
no revenue, and Pigou apparently concludes that
this is not a practical solution. He then states that
"absolute prohibition is required... but this is
hardly feasible except where prices and conditions
of sale are imposed upon private industry by some
organ of State authority." As Pigou does not discuss the subject further, the significance of this
statement is not evident. To me it demonstrates the
bankruptcy of the Pigovian approach, but this
could hardly have been Pigou's purpose. Pigou's
solution would require the State to fix the terms of
every transaction, a procedure which would paralyse the working of the economic system. I argued
in "The Problem of Social Cost" that in deciding
on economic policy, we should not concern ourselves with the ideal (whatever that may be) but
should start with the available alternatives and
should endeavor to discover which among them
produces, in total, the best result.
Furthermore, I argued that the available alternatives were not confined to the imposition of taxes or
direct governmental regulation, as most economists
seem to have thought, but included changes in the
law governing the rights and duties of individuals
and organizations. The definition of the rights that
individuals and organizations are deemed to possess is important because, by setting the starting
point, it determines what transactions have to be
carried out to achieve any other constellation of
rights and therefore the costs of so doing. People
will wish to negotiate to change the initial constellation whenever this would increase the value of pro19

duction-but only after deducting the costs of the
necessary transactions. And these costs depend on
the initial legal position. It is therefore easy to see
that the final outcome is affected by the law. I concluded in "The Problem of Social Cost" that the
value of production would be maximised if rights
were deemed to be possessed by those to whom they
were most valuable, thus eliminating the need for
any transactions.
In a blackmailing scheme, the person who will
pay the most for the right to stop the action threatened is normally the person being blackmailed. If
the right to stop this action is denied to others, that
is, blackmail is made illegal, transaction costs are
reduced, factors of production are released for other
purposes and the value of production is increased.
This is an approach which comes quite naturally to
an economist and was certainly the way in which I
first analysed the problem of blackmail.
Blackmail involves the expenditure of resources
in the collection of information which, on payment
of blackmail, will be suppressed. It would be better
if this information were not collected and the
resources were used to produce something of value.
Professor Lindgren has objected to this rationale
for making blackmail illegal on the ground that it
does not explain why it is illegal to demand money
for not revealing information accidentally
acquired." He gives as an example the case of a
workman on a ladder who blackmailed a clergyman after observing him engaged in paying attention to a member of his flock which apparently
went well beyond the call of duty. While it is true
that in such a case no resources were used to collect
the information, resources would certainly be
employed in the blackmailing transaction. Furthermore, it is difficult for me to believe that, were
blackmail made legal, such accidental sightings
would not occur more frequently.
Nonetheless, I believe that Professor Lindgren is
right in sensing that this objection to blackmail,
correct though it may be, does not explain why
there is such general support for making blackmail
not merely illegal but a crime. After all, in public
life we often observe great tolerance of, and indeed
encouragement for, policies which waste resources
on a grand scale. It is not because blackmail
involves a misallocation of resources that the Crim29. Lindgren, supra note 3, at 690, 695.
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inal Law Revision Committee considers as
"entirely justified" the "detestation with which
blackmail is commonly regarded." 0 In a passage I
have already quoted Mr. Bechhofer Roberts says
that "blackmail is by many people considered the
foulest of crimes-far crueller than most murders,
because of its cold-blooded premeditation and
repeated torture of the victim." The Criminal Law
Revision Committee comment that blackmail "can
be an extremely cruel offence, causing endless
misery."
It is not difficult to understand why people feel
this way. A blackmailer threatens to do something
which will harm his victim unless he is paid a sum
of money or receives some other benefit and by
emphasising the unpleasant consequences for the
victim of not meeting his demands (or even inventing them, as in the "Mr. A Case"), he endeavours
to extract as much as he can from him. It may be
objected that this is exactly what happens in business negotiations. And this is correct. But the situations are not identical. The demands made by a
businessman are constrained by the competition of
other businessmen, by the fact that the party
threatened is likely to have a good idea of whether
the threat has to be taken seriously and by the
adverse effects on future business of being difficult
in negotiating. None of this applies in the ordinary
blackmail case. There is no competition. The victim has to deal with the blackmailer. The victim is
also likely to be uncertain about the blackmailer's
real intentions. And concern for future business
will not moderate a blackmailer's demands. If this
factor has any influence, it pays the blackmailer to
be unreasonable and even to carry out his threat,
since this would make future victims take his
threats more seriously. And there are even more
important differences. The blackmailer's actions
generate fear and anxiety-blackmailing involves
more than the employment of resources which
leave the value of production unchanged-it causes
real harm which reduces the value of production
just as with Pigou's railway whose sparks cause
fires in the adjoining woods. The position is, however, much worse for the blackmail victim than the
owner of the woods. He cannot appeal to the law,
since this would involve that disclosure of facts
which he is anxious to avoid. But there is, I believe,
30. Criminal Law Revision Committee, supra note 21, at
61.
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another difference, even more important than the
others. Business negotiations (which may also
cause anxiety) either lead to a breakdown of the
negotiations or they lead to a contract. Thereis, at
any rate, an end. But in the ordinary blackmail
case there is no end. The victim, once he succumbs
to the blackmailer, remains in his grip for an indefinite period. It is moral murder. And, as the Criminal Law Revision Committee says, "it is certain
that a great deal of it goes on which never comes to
light. "1

The problem is that all trade involves threatening not to do something unless certain demands are
met. Furthermore, negotiations about the terms of
trade are likely to involve the making of threats
which it would be better if they were not made (and
in this Pigou is right). But it is only certain threats
in certain situations which cause harm on balance
and in which the harm is sufficiently great as to
make it desirable that those making them should be
prosecuted and punished. I think it is clear what is
wrong with blackmail. The problem is to know how
to deal with it. The British solution seems to have
been to pass a statute defining blackmail which
makes no clear distinction between these cases but
leaves it up to prosecutors, juries, and judges to be
sensible. Whether this is the best that can be done
is a question for lawyers to decide. It would be a sad
day if all the answers had to be provided by
economists.

31. Id.
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